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RELATIONS BETWEEN REGULATION,
COMPETITION POLICY AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
ELECTRICITY AND WATER SUPPLYt
Gesner de Oliveira*
Sgrgio Goldbaum**
I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Article is to discuss the relationship between regulation, compeliion policy and consumer protection in three key sectors of Brazil's infrastructure: Telecommunications, electricity and water supply. A study of the literature points to two general principles. First, the need for consumer protection depends on the "degree of sovereignty" enjoyed by consumers, defined
in terms of the cost of consumer organization, the ability
t
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of consumers to evaluate services and the level of competition in each sector.1 Second, the less sovereignty consumers enjoy, the more consumer protection institutions
are involved with regulatory agencies. 2 The evidence for
the Brazilian case apparently corroborates these points.
In addition, it is important to stress that consumer complaints in regulated sectors seem to have increased more
intensely than in other sectors.3
This Article is divided into three sections. Section
II presents theoretical elements and aspects of the relations between regulation, competition policy and consumer protection evidenced by international experience.
Section III analyzes the Brazilian experience, in particular, the available statistics on consumer complaints about
telecommunications, electricity and water supply, submitted to Brazilian consumer protection agencies during the
1990's. Section IV points to possible configurations of the
institutional relations between competition policy, regulation and consumer protection, showing how the existing
configuration of these areas in the three infrastructure
sectors discussed confirms that the theoretical framework
proposed has reasonable predictive power.
II. CONSUMER PROTECTION: THEORETICAL ELEMENTS AND
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

This Section presents theoretical elements and aspects of international experience in consumer protection
and their relations with competition policy and regulation. Historically speaking, the emergence of consumer
protection policies was associated with: (i) the development of mass production and consumption, which led to
impersonal consumption relations; (ii) rising incomes,
which drove an increase in consumption of technologyintensive consumer durables; and (iii) the expansion of
1.

Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A

Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713
(1997). See also Gesner de Oliveira, A Articulaido Entre Regula~do, Defesa da
Concorr~nciae Proteqdo do Consumidor nos Setores de Telecomunicagdes,
EnergiaEldtricaE Saneamento Bdsico, 54 RELATORIO DE PESQUISA 1 (2001).
2.
3.

See Oliveira, supra note 1, at 123.
Id. at 107-08.
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services. 4 In these categories, evaluation of product quality, comprehension of instructions for use and infrequent
commercial relations are factors that have heightened the
importance of institutional mechanisms for consumer protection.
Among the developed countries of the world, consumer protection policies and institutions emerged during
the 1960's and 1970's. The United States, for example,
saw the rise of a "consumerist" movement led by charismatic personalities like Ralph Nader. Activists known as
Nader's Raiders succeeded in obliging auto manufacturers
to fit all vehicles with safety equipment.5 The belated appearance of consumer protection policies in Latin American countries is attributed by Eduardo Engel to the political situation prevailing in these countries throughout
most of the century.6 The ideological right, which was
hegemonic in much of the region during the period, was
too beholden to large, powerful corporations to impose
consumer protection, while the center and left rejected the
idea of market freedom.'
Engel divides consumer protection activities into
two kinds: (i) consumer protection policy, properly speaking, which is designed to modify the status quo in terms of
the information available to consumers; and (ii) consumer
promotion, geared toward education and the creation of
institutions and associations for consumer protection advocacy.8 Information of relevance to consumer protection
is disseminated by the media and special-interest magazines, although sometimes there are conflicts between the
information they publish and the interests of their sponsors. Compensation is a powerful institutional mechanism
for consumer promotion, but the possibility of obtaining

4.

Eduardo Engel, Beyond the Basics of Consumer Protection, in

REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM:

A

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

131 (Clau-

dio R. Frischtak ed., 1995). See also Gisela Black Taschner, Protetfo ao Consumidor: Urn Estudo ComparativoInternacional,1 RELAT6RIO DE PESQUISA 1,
4, 28-32 (1995).
5.
Taschner, supranote 4, at 28-32.
6.
Id.
7.
Id. at 137.
8.
Id. at 131. See also Eduardo Engel, The Basics of Consumer Protection: Principles and Policies, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTivE 104 (Claudio R. Frischtak ed., 1995).
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compensation is frequently limited by the high transaction cost of litigation.
Engel subdivides consumer protection and promotion policies into two main types: (i) policies introduced by
government, either through public consumer protection
agencies or through measures designed to reduce the
transaction cost of litigation, or again through the creation of alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution; and
(ii) private-sector initiatives such as the creation of customer service centers by corporations and consumer affairs columns in the media.9
Insofar as consumer protection and promotion policies oblige business organizations to comply with certain
quality standards, the existence of consumers who actively advocate respect for their rights and institutional
mechanisms that provide for such activism reduces the
need for more strenuous regulatory intervention. ' With
regard to trade liberalization and competition, it should
be stressed that although arguments for consumer protection have often been used as a form of non-tariff barrier, 1
trade liberalization and increasingly intense competition
in many countries have forced governments and exporters
to adopt stricter consumer protection policies. This is either because local producers find themselves competing
with imported products made to stricter quality standards
or because local consumers gain increasing access to technology-intensive products and experience greater difficulty in obtaining information about these products, as
well as compensation when appropriate." Lastly, with regard to the competitiveness of local industry, although
local producers often complain that consumer protection
laws will make their products more expensive and therefore less competitive, the existence of organized consumers stimulates local producers to comply with higher quality standards, thus enhancing their competitiveness in
more demanding markets and reducing the initial investment required to launch a product abroad. 13
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Engel, supra note 4, at 133-34.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 134-35.
Id.
Id. at 136.
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Neil W. Averitt and Robert H. Lande have analyzed
the relationship between antitrust and consumer protection law. 4 In their understanding, competition policy and
consumer protection share a common goal: They are both
intended to facilitate the exercise of what they call "consumer sovereignty," or effective consumer choice. 5 The
authors define "consumer sovereignty" as a state in which
consumers can freely take decisions based on their individual interests and in which markets will respond to the
collective effect of those decisions. 6 Competition policy
tends to provide consumers with a competitive range of
choices, while consumer protection tends to ensure that
consumers can effectively choose among the options available without their critical faculties being hampered by
such violations as deception or omission of material information. 7
Both competition policy and consumer protection
are theoretically justified on the basis of the possible occurrence of "market failures," such as abuse of economic
power, asymmetrical information, transaction costs, externalities, entry barriers and natural monopolies." The
authors then subdivide market failures into two categories: (i) those external to consumer relations, comprised of
restrictions to the range of consumer choices which can be
corrected within the sphere of competition policy; and (ii)
those internal to consumer relations, comprised of restrictions to the consumer's ability to choose freely from
among the options available which can be corrected
within the sphere of consumer protection.' 9
Thus, market imperfections such as imperfect information and irrecoverable entry costs, or anticompetitive conduct such as price or reputation predation,
price fixing, horizontal restrictions, mergers and vertical
restrictions, fall within the exclusive remit of competition
policy. On the other hand, the sphere of consumer protection covers cases involving complaints relating to product
features, warranties and contractual clauses associated
14.

Averitt & Lande, supranote 1, at 713.

15. Id.
16.
17.

Id. at 722.
Id. at 714.

18. Id.
19. Id.
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with market failures whose impact harms four types of
consumer: (i) those whose freedom of choice is subject to
some form of coercion; (ii) "vulnerable" groups (such as
children); (iii) victims of misleading or incomplete information; and (iv) consumers who have to deal with information that may be difficult to understand. 20 There are
also certain "hybrid" cases that involve constraints on
both consumer choice and the effectiveness of choosing
among the existing options. This is the case, for example,
with conduct that results in higher search costs, tied sales
or resale price fixing.
Averitt and Lande therefore propose a "unified"
theory with some practical implications.' First, the construction of a relevant theoretical framework would help
the parties to match a specific issue with the appropriate
legal theory.22 Second, close functional relationships between action to conserve options and action to preserve
freedom of choice among existing options would show why
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") was created and
why its status should remain unchanged.2 3 Third, a unified theory would facilitate the discussion of issues that
do not involve only price competition, thus making competition policy more sensitive to non-price competition. 4
This is especially important, for example, in the case of
mergers between media organizations.
Averitt and Lande's justification for the connection
between competition policy and consumer protection is of
particular interest to the discussion developed here. The
authors advocate combination of both activities in a single
agency, in that antitrust and consumer protection functions can and should work together to safeguard the exercise of consumer sovereignty. 25 According to Averitt and
Lande, the problems of competition policy and consumer
protection are of the same nature, and in practice the in20. Averitt & Lande, supra note 1, at 733.
21. Id. at 744.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 747. It should be stressed, however, that unlike the FTC,
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice specializes in competition policy and does not intervene in matters pertaining to consumer protection. Id.
24. Id. at 745.
25. Averitt & Lande, supranote 1, at 756.
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terests of both functions converge.26 As will be demonstrated in Section IV, we take the opposite view: our understanding is that although both functions stimulate
each other reciprocally," there are not necessarily any
scope economies to be achieved by combining them. Thus,
there is no justification for submitting them to common
routines. Averitt and Lande anticipate the approach
adopted in this discussion, noting that it is highly tempting to think about these functions as being very different
and related only at the most general and abstract level
inasmuch as both bureaus aim in the final analysis to improve the well-being of consumers.'
Based on the observation that the routines remain
independent even where the same agency has jurisdiction
29
over competition policy and consumer protection, we
maintain our opposition to Averitt and Lande, albeit noting that their approach provides important arguments in
favor of giving consumer protection agencies more influence over the decisions taken by competition agencies.
In Brazil, the problem of how consumer protection,
regulation and competition policy interrelate is illustrated
by Jos6 R.L. Lopes.3 Lopes is in charge of consumer affairs at the National Petroleum Agency ("ANP"), which
regulates the oil industry. In an article published by 0
Estado de Sio Paulo, he criticized the idea of creating a
National Competition Agency ("ANC") on the grounds
that it would not give priority to consumer protection.3 '
According to the article, "consumer protection is the poor
cousin of economic law."3 2 He goes on to argue that the
proposed creation of the ANC "merely shows that the debate remains focused on how to defend capital against

26. Id.
27. See Engel, supranote 4, at 106.
28. Averitt & Lande, supranote 1, at 756.
29. For example, the FTC in the United States and the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission.
30. Jos6 Reinaldo L. Lopes is a professor at the Law School of the
University of Sao Paulo and coordinator of Consumer Relations of the National Petroleum Agency. See Jos6 Reinaldo L. Lopes, Quem Defenderd o Consumidor?, 0 ESTADO DE S. PAULO, Jan. 31, 2001, at 2, available at
http'//www.estado.com.br/editorius/2001/01/31/eco914.h tml.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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capital itself through a committee of big business. Little is
said about the consumer. Only capital seems to matter."33
Lopes criticizes the draft bill proposing to create
the ANC because it does not contemplate inclusion of a
Collegiate Executive or Consultative Council for Consumer Protection, 34 and because the functions of the collegiate body are confined to administrative matters, with
the sole exception of Clause 11,3' whose generality is not
resolved by any other article in the draft bill. Furthermore, Lopes does not see what role can be played by a
federal consumer protection agency if consumer law is
constituted within the judicial arena, which pertains to
the state sphere in Brazil's federal institutional framework.36 With regard to regulation, Lopes asks how the
ANC would relate to the regulatory agencies:
All the regulatory agencies created so far are restricted
to a single economic sector. The new agency's jurisdiction does not pertain to any sector in particular. What
role will it play, then, given that it will be suited only to
oversee mass consumption in non-regulated sectors? It
must be borne in mind that the existing agencies are not
consumer protection bureaus, although they are expected to take the consumer's interests into account.
Lastly, Lopes warns that linking the consumer protection system to a new Competition Agency could relegate consumer protection to a secondary role.38 According
to his article, several cases have been submitted to the
Administrative Council for Economic Defense ("CADE"),
an agency of the Justice Ministry, on the initiative of consumers, but CADE's decisions have never been directly
favorable to them.39 Lopes recalls a lawsuit heard in 1998
in which a consumer succeeded in winning a judicial annulment of a contractual clause deemed abusive.4 ° CADE
also investigated the case but decided to focus on two aspects alone: (i) whether the economic agent's practice in33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Lopes, supra note 30, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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terfered with competition; and (ii) whether its price hikes
had actually or potentially eliminated competitors.41 Loyes
concludes that the verdict went against the consulner.
III. EVOLUTION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE

NINETIES: COMPLAINTS AGAINST ELECTRICITY, WATER
SUPPLY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS UTILITIES

This Section discusses recent trends in complaints
submitted to consumer protection agencies with a view to
examining the peculiarities of regulated industries and in
particular the selected infrastructure sectors.
A. The Brazilian Consumer ProtectionSystem
The Brazilian consumer protection system was
built up under pressure from social movements and broad
advocacy of increased access to the courts during the late
1970's and early 1980's as part of the nation's return to
democracy after a long period of military rule.43 The key
milestones in this process were laws creating small claims
tribunals, public civil suits and the Consumer Defense
Code.45 In 1997, the National Consumer Protection System ("SNDC") was created by Decree 2.181,46 comprising
the Economic Law Department ("SDE") of the Justice
Ministry through its Consumer Protection & Defense Department ("DPDC") and other agencies of the federal,
state and municipal governments, as well as civil associations of consumer activists. 47 Among the powers of the

DPDC set out in Article 3 of Decree 2.181, it is worth citing Clause XII: "[Clalling upon the Economic Law Department to enter into agreements and memoranda of
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Lopes, supra note 30, at 2.
See Taschner, supra note 4, at 36-45.
Lei No. 9.099, 26 de Setembro de 1995, D.O.U. de 27.09. 1995.

45.

CODIGO DE PROTEQAO E DEFESA DO CONSUMIDOR

[C.D.C.] Lei No.

8.078, de 11 Setembro de 1997, D.O.U de 12.09.1997.
46. Decreto No. 2.181, de 20 de Margo de 1997, D.O.U. de
21.03.1997.
47. Id.
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understanding to bring about a change of conduct."4" The
Consumer Defense Code established a National Consumer
Relations Policy49 in which low-income consumers are
guaranteed the right to full legal assistance free of charge
through small claims tribunals (now termed special civil
courts).5" This Article also called for the creation of special
police forces and public prosecutors for consumer protection, as well as fostering the organization of consumer associations. 1 Other items of the Consumer Defense Code
worth mentioning are: (i) exemptions from court fees and
stamp duties for low-income consumers;" (ii) incentives
for civil associations to seek compensation for consumers,
again with exemption from legal charges;53 (iii) government's duty to seek judicial review of cases that involve
collective or diffuse interests;54 and (iv) importer liability
for accidents arising from imported goods.55 Besides the
DPDC, the SNDC also comprises agencies of all three
tiers of government and civil associations. Probably the
most important of the latter are the twenty-seven state
and more than 500 municipal bureaus of Coordenadoria
de Protedo e Defesa do Consumidor ("Procon").
In Sdo Paulo State, Fundagdo Procon-SP ("ProconSP") was devised in 1976 through Decree 7.890, which
created the State Consumer Protection System.56 In 1982,
Procon-SP was restructured through the activities of the
Executive Group for Consumer Protection.5 7 The Sdo
Paulo State Public Prosecutor's Office set up a Consumer
Protection Department in 1983, initially to operate in col48. Id. cl. XII.
49. C.D.C. arts. 4-5.
50. Id. art. 5, cl. I & IV.
51. Id. art. 87.
52. Id. art. 81.
53. Id. art. 12.
54. Id. § 1978a.
55. C.D.C. § 1978b.
56. Decreto No. 7.890 de 6 de Maio de 1976, D.O.E.S.P. de
07.05.1976.
57. For a brief history of the key milestones in the emergence of the
Brazilian consumer protection system, see Breve Hist6rico dai Protegdo ao
Consumidor, at http'//www.procon.sp.gov.br/institucionalhistorico.htm (last
visited Nov. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Hist6rico]. See also Oliveira, supra note 1,
at 99.
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laboration with Procon."8 This department was expanded
in 1985, entering into agreements with municipal governments throughout the State and with civil associations. 9 In 1987, an entirely new department of the Sdo
Paulo State Government was set up to handle consumer
affairs, and this in turn created an Inspection Service,
now known as the Adjunct Directorate for Inspection &
Consumer Protection."
In 1991, Procon-SP changed its name to the Division for Consumer Protection & Defense and was subordinated to the Sdo Paulo State Department of Justice &
Defense of Citizenship.6 ' Finally, Law 9.19262 and Decree
41.17063 transformed Fundagdo Procon-SP into a public-.
law entity funded out of the state budget, together with
donations, contributions, internally generated revenue
and fines.
B. Consumer ProtectionIn Telecommunications, Electricity & Water Supply
Figure 1 is a flow chart outlining the process
whereby Procon-SP handles consumer queries and complaints. Any citizen can complain to the agency or request
information.6 On receiving an application from a consumer through one of its citizens' advice bureaus (Pontos
de Atendimento), Procon-SP contacts the supplier of the
product or service concerned.65 The supplier may or may
not accept the complaint.66 If accepted, the complaint is
discharged and not kept on file in Procon-SP's archive of
justified complaints. If the supplier does not accept the
complaint, the case is investigated by one of Procon-SP's
specialized units, of which there are six: (i) food; (ii) hous58.

See Hist6rico,supra note 57.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62.

Lei No. 9.192, de 23 de Novembro de 1995, D.O.E.S.P. de

24.09.1996.
63.
24.09.1996.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Decreto No. 41.170, de 23 de Setembro de 1996; D.O.E.S.P. de
See also Oliveira, supranote 1, at 99.
See Oliveira, supranote 1, at 137-38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ing; (iii) health; (iv) financial affairs; (v) products; and (vi)
services (public and private).68
On completion of the investigation, the parties are
summoned to a reconciliation hearing.69 If the complaint is
resolved at this hearing, the case is filed away under "satisfied complaints."" If not, the case is classified as an "unsatisfied complaint" and depending on the value attributed to it may be directly submitted to a special civil court
(i.e., a small claims tribunal) or the complainant may be
advised to initiate legal proceedings. 7 ' In addition, ProconSP may enter an official complaint against the supplier in
its capacity as consumer protection agency. 2 If this is the
case, the official complaint is forwarded to the inspection
service, which then collaborates with the agency's technical staff to produce an opinion or carry out an inspection,
which may result in a fine.73 Procon-SP also conducts
regular analyses of complaints against specific industries
or sectors.7 ' These are the basis for preventive actions that
include the formation of working groups to discuss quality
standards and other aspects of the supply of goods and
services. 75 A successful example is the tourism industry,
which has standardized the forms and procedures used by
travel agents in order to avoid recurrent problems with
tourism operations. 6

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
See Oliveira, supra note 1, at 137-38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Oliveira, supra note 1, at 137-38.
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Figure 1: Flow Chart Procon-SP

7

Figure 2 shows the total number of queries and
complaints submitted to Procon-SP between 1977 and
September 2000.78 The numbers are grouped into two
categories, queries (requests for information) and complaints. Complaints are in fact queries that have not been
resolved directly by the service center or through corre77. This chart was produced with the assistance of Maria Isabel
Vergueiro Pupo, a member of the consumer protection technical staff at Procon-SP.
78. Id.
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spondence with the supplier and have therefore been forwarded to technical staff for further investigation.79
It can be seen that the aggregation method has
changed during the period. For example, until 1995 "queries" included "direct service and correspondence issued,"
while between 1996 and 2000 these activities, sometimes
referred to as "M1A Letters," were classified under "complaints." Nevertheless, the total number of queries and
complaints increased noticeably at two points, subsequent
to 1986 and in 1994, probably reflecting the institutional
changes described in this Article.
Figure 2: Services Provided by Procon-SP, 1977-2000
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996"
1997
1998
1999
2000**

IUI/AL

272
462
2.509
4.326
3 528
9.893
14.756
23.853
40.362
113 396
118 445
96 085
132.520
104.988
115 407
180.801
160 741
256.631
279.419
247.381
184.382
287.870
235.463
231.688

2.031
3.704
3.921
5.334
6.114
5.913
3.725
4.487
11.301
6.559
6.458
8.496
7.908
7.679
11.320
11 506
12.826
11.182
55.447
53.942
80.564
54.411
53.539

2.493
6.213
8.247
8.862
16.007
20.669
27.578
44.849
124.697
125.004
102.543
141.016
112.896
123.086
192.121
172.247
269.457
290.601
302.828
238.324
368.434
289.874
285.227

*Data for the period 1996-2000 include queries to the list of suppliers and price surveys. ** Breakdown of queries/complaints obtained by extrapolation of data for January-September 2000.

79. A detailed chart summarizing the queries and complaints submitted to Procon-SP will be found in Appendix A.1.
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Article 44 of the Consumer Defense Code states
that consumer protection agencies are obliged to publish
an annual list ofjustified complaints. 0 This obligation has
been discharged since 1992 through publication of the list
in the Sdo Paulo State Daily Register (Didrio Oficial do
Estado de Sdo Paulo), although in 1992 the document as
published contained only data for March to December.
The list, officially termed a Cadastro, presents general
information about the activities of consumer protection
services as well as details of justified complaints, grouped
according to the companies involved." Both queries and
complaints are also broken down into six categories: (i)
food; (ii) health; (iii) housing; (iv) products; (v) services;
and (vi) financial affairs. 2 Additionally, in certain years
the document includes items classified as: "External to
Procon," meaning cases forwarded to other agencies; "Inspection," referring to the involvement of inspectors in the
investigation; and "CAD/PESQ," indicating not a complaint as such, but consultation of Procon-SP's records.88
Figure 3: Procon-SP--Services Provided by Area, 1994-1999
,AREAS
FOOD
HEALTH
HOUSING
PRODUCTS
SERVICES
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
INSPECTION
EXTERNALTO PROCON
'CAD-PESQ
1T AL

1994
2.649
22.088
115.588
34.506
46.943
22.965
321
24.396
0
269.456

1995
2.193
11.667
114.537
44.760
58.641
23.836
321
34.646
0
290.601

1996
1.374
23.374
54.015
47.853
66.159
25.290
343
32.451
51.969
302.82

1997
1.353
15.401
25.090
43.672
58.140
24.853
228
33.726
35.861
238.324

1998
1.902
18.376
23.336
57.863
113.666
62.576
329
56.835
33.551
368.434

1999
692
16.244
13.344
34.864
115.299
49.951
0
67.641
0
296,035

2000.
788
17.771
11.660
42487
93.767
44.437
74.317
285.227

80. C.D.C. art. 44. "Justified complaints" refers to complaints that
were not resolved directly by citizens' advice bureaus or through correspondence with suppliers, and were therefore forwarded to the technical areas of
Procon-SP. A flow chart showing the procedures for handling consumer queries and complaints at Procon-SP can be found in Figure 1.
81. Fundago de Protedo e Defesa do Consumidor, CADASTRO DE
RECLAMAgOES FUNDAMENTADAS,

2000, at 26, 43, 57-59, 80, 126, 141-42, 150,

available at http'//www.procon.sp.gov.br (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) [hereinafter CADAsTRo 2000].
82. Id.
83. Id. at 104.

80
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Figure 3 shows services rendered by area in the period 1994-1999.m Figure 4 shows the evolution of these
services in percentage terms by sector in the period 19941999, excluding items classified as "External to Procon,"
"Inspection" and "CAD/PESQ." It can be seen that a decrease in the number of queries and justified complaints
relating to "Housing" was more than offset by an increase
in the category "Services" and, albeit to a lesser extent, in
"Financial Affairs." Justified complaints relating to telecommunications, electricity and water supply are included in the category "Services."8

84. Fundagdo de Protego e Defesa do Consumidor, CADASTRO DE
RECLAMAQOES FUNDAMENTADAS, 1994, at 27, 52, 119, 133, available at
http'/www.procon.sp.gov.br (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) [hereinafter CADASTRO
1994]; Fundaqao de Protegao e Defesa do Consumidor, CADASTRO DE
RECLAMAq0ES FUNDAMENTADAS, 1995, at 54, 64, 153, 173, available at
http://www.procon.sp.gov.br (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) [hereinafter CADASTRO
1995]; Fundago de Protegdo e Defesa do Consumidor, CADASTRO DE
RECLAMAQOES FUNDAMENTADAS,
1996, at 100, 237, 266, available at
http://www.procon.sp.gov.br (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) [hereinafter CADASTRO
1996]; Fundagdo de Protegdo e Defesa do Consumidor, CADASTRO DE
RECLAMAQ0ES FUNDAMENTADAS, 1997, at 75, 184, 206, available at
http'//www.procon.sp.gov.br (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) [hereinafter CADASTRO
1997]; Fundagdo de Protegao e Defesa do Consumidor, CADASTRO DE
RECLAMAc0ES FUNDAMENTADAS, 1998, at 35, 106, 107, 249, 281, available at
http://www.procon.sp.gov.br (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) [hereinafter CADASTRO
1998]; Fundagdo de Protegdo e Defesa do Consumidor, CADASTRO DE
RECLAMAQOES FUNDAMENTADAS, 1999, at 36, 37, 60, 102-03, 245-46, 276-77,
availableat http://www.procon.sp.gov.br (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) [hereinafter CADASTRO 1999].
85. See CADASTRO 1994-1999, supra note 81.
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Figure 4: Procon-SP-Services Provided by Sector of
Activity, 1992-1999
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Figure 5 shows the data for justified complaints relating to these three infrastructure sectors in the period
1992-1999.86 In the case of telecommunications, the research project focused on fixed-line and wireless telephony services. 7 The same table compares justified complaints relating to all three sectors with complaints relating to other services and with total complaints.

86. Fundago de Protego e Defesa do Consumidor, CADASTRO DE
FUNDAMENTADAS,
1992,
at
128,
available at
http'//www.procon.sp.gov.br (last visited Nov. 6, 2001) [hereinafter CADASTRO
RECLAMAgOES

1992]; Fundagdo de Protedo e Defesa do Consumidor, CADASTRO DE
FUNDAMENTADA,
1993, at 54, 120, 133, available at
http//www.procon.sp.gov.br (last visited Nov. 6, 2001) [hereinafter CADASTRO
1993]. See also CADASTRO 1994-1999, supra note 84. A full breakdown ofjustifled complaints by company and by type of complaint can also be found in
Oliveira, supranote 1, at 139-44.
RECLAMAQ0ES

87.

See CADATRO 1992-1993, supra note 86; CADASTRO 1994-1999,

supranote 84.
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Figure 5: Procon-SP - Total Justified Complaints Relating to Electricity, Telecommunications (Telephony) & Water
Supply, by Company, 1992-1999
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The inconsistencies caused by classifying "correspondence issued" either under "queries" or "complaints"
also affects the data in this table. Disaggregated data for
complaints about services and total complaints excluding
"correspondence issued" are available only for 1994 and
1996-1998.8" This is why the table has two columns for
"services" (columns E and F) and two for "total complaints" (columns H and I), excluding or including "correspondence issued." Moreover, data for 1995 was obtained
by interpolation.9 Aggregate data for complaints and que-

88.
89.

See CADASTRO 1994, 1996, 1998, supra note 84.
See Oliveira, supra note 1, at 106.
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ries including "correspondence issued" (where available)
are given in Appendix A.1.
It can be seen that the total amount of justified
complaints against the three sectors analyzed decreased
in 1995, but the decrease was accompanied by a proportional fall in the total number of complaints about "services" (column E) and "total complaints" (column H)9° . In
1999, the total number of justified complaints about telecommunications (telephony) grew very sharply, accounting for 32.4% of all complaints about "services" (column F)
and 19.4% of "total complaints" (column I).91 Can a difference in the evolution of complaints relating to the three
sectors analyzed be observed when compared with complaints relating to other services or with the total number
of complaints? Figure 5 illustrates this trend.
Figure 6: Procon-SP-Evolution of Justified Complaints Relating to Regulated Sectors Compared with Evolution of Complaints Relating to Other Services & Total Complaints
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Figure 6 shows the evolution of justified complaints
about the regulated sectors analyzed (telephony, electricity and water supply), compared with justified complaints

90. See CADASTRO 1995, supra note 84.
91. See CADASTRO 1999, supra note 84. In the following year, there
were 999 justified complaints to Procon-SP about telecommunications. The
decrease can be attributed to the fact that Anatel began operating a federal
service to receive complaints from any citizen on this subject. See CADASTRO
2000, supra note 81.
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about other services and total justified complaints.92 In
order to answer the question posed earlier, we plotted a
regression for justified complaints against years in the
three cases based on a semi-logarithmic specification. The
results corroborate the hypothesis that the number of
complaints about regulated services during the period increased proportionally more than total complaints and
complaints about other services. The coefficient for the
evolution of complaints about regulated services was
0.2304, whereas the coefficient for other services was
0.088 and the coefficient for total complaints was 0.0525.
These values translate into the following rates of increase
in complaints relating to the three sectors, other services
and total complaints for the period 1992-2000: 23%, 8.8%
and 5.25% respectively.93
However, it should be noted that: (i) the t-test for
statistical significance does not reject the null-coefficient
hypothesis at 90% significance, p-values are 13%, 14%
and 20% respectively; (ii) the data available include "correspondence issued" in complaints about other services
and total complaints, unlike complaints about the three
sectors analyzed, thus overestimating the increase in the
occurrence of these variables; and (iii) "total complaints"
includes complaints about other regulated services such
as banking and healthcare, thus weakening the conclusion about the trends observed in complaints relating specifically to the regulated sectors in question.
The graphs in Figure 7 facilitate a comparison of
complaints received about each of the three sectors analyzed in the period 1992-2000. 9' In percentage terms for
the entire period, complaints relating to telecommunications were processed most effectively: 86% were resolved
in this case, while the proportion of complaints about electricity and water supply resolved was 38% and 64% respectively. However, the graphs in Figure 7 point to an
even more important trend: The relative share of complaints resolved increased in all sectors during the period,
92. See CADASTRO 1992-1993, supra note 86; CADASTRO 1994-1999,
supra note 84; CADASTRO 2000, supra note 81.
93. See Regression Results in Appendix A.2.
94. See CADASTRO 1992-1993, supra note 86; CADASTRO 1994-1999,
supra note 84; CADASTRO 2000 supra note 81.
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suggesting that consumer protection has effectively increased in importance and has been more effectively enforced in recent years.
Figure 7: Procon-SP - Resolved Complaints in Telecommunications, Electricity & Water Supply, 1992-2000.
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IV. RELATIONS BETWEEN COMPETITION POLICY,
REGULATION & CONSUMER PROTECTION

This Section is divided into three parts. The first
analyzes the functions of regulation, competition policy
and consumer protection from a comparative perspective.
The second introduces the concept of consumer sovereignty and proposes a method of measuring it in the case
of telecommunications, electricity and water supply. The
third and last part suggests institutional configurations of
the three functions in accordance with the degree of sovereignty in each of the sectors analyzed.
A. Competition Policy, Regulation & Consumer Protection
From A ComparativePerspective
Figure 8 compares the functions of competition policy, regulation and consumer protection. The regulatory
function has broader objectives, which involve technical,
sanitary, environmental and economic regulation as well
as oversight, inspection and preventive action. Its activities include substitution for market mechanisms and it
mainly precedes the consummation of market transactions.
The methods used in consumer protection also involve substitution for market mechanisms, but its objec-
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tives are more limited and the activities concerned take
place mainly after transactions are concluded. The objectives of competition policy are also more limited but the
methods used to achieve them prioritize the use of market
mechanisms. All three functions are justified from the
standpoint of economic theory by the existence of market
failures. These failures originate in problems of market
power, asymmetric information, and the existence of public goods or externalities. The general objectives of the
three functions are convergent (promotion of consumer
well being), and each agency specializes in carrying out its
specific activities. However, some activities are common
to the functions of regulation and competition policy (economic regulation), while others are common to the functions of regulation and consumer protection (oversight
and preventive action).
With regard to the relations between competition
policy and consumer protection, although their general
objectives are convergent and the two functions reinforce
each other, they do not share a significant number of routines in performing their specific activities. Thus, there is
no justification for suggesting unification of the two, at
least not from the standpoint of administrative macroprocesses.95

95. Similarly, activities designed to promote competition and maintain macroeconomic stability or attract foreign direct investment are mutually stimulating, but this does not mean that mechanisms for coordination of
their activities should be created, linking CADE with the Central Bank and
the Finance Ministry.
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Figure 8: Comparison of the Functions of Competition
Policy, Regulation & Consumer Protection
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Figure 9: Relations Between Competition Policy & Consumer Protection-Optimal Configuration
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If there are significant economies of scope in the
performance of common activities and if the transaction
costs are high, there will be incentives for the agencies to
share activities. On the other hand, if the transaction
costs are high but there are no economies of scope, agencies will tend to perform their activities separately. Figure
9 illustrates this argument. The relationship between
regulation and consumer protection combine low economies of scope with low economies of transaction costs. In
this case, separation of their activities appears to be more
efficient. On the other hand, both the relationship between regulation and competition policy and the relationship between regulation and consumer protection combine
low economies of scope with high transaction costs. In
both cases, the most efficient institutional configuration is
indefinite.
The possible institutional configurations of the relationship between regulation and competition policy are
analyzed in a previous study.96 This Article emphasizes
the relationship between regulation and consumer protection. As already mentioned, specific activities can be observed both for the regulatory function (cancellation of
utility license contracts, for example) and for the consumer protection function (protection of vulnerable consumers, for example). However, there are also activities
that are common to both functions, especially oversight,
inspection and protection, all of which can be shared.

96. See Gesner de Oliveira & Caio Mdrio da Silva Pereira Neto,
Regulation and Competition Policy: Toward an Optimal Institutional Configuration in the Brazilian Telecommunications Industry, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 311 (1999).
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B. Degrees of Consumer Sovereignty
There are several factors that may affect the degree
of consumer sovereignty. This concept can be defined as
the extent-to which market failures can be deemed to exist so that consumers require more or less systematic protection from the state. There are three basic reasons for
which consumer protection is justified from the economic
standpoint: (i) information asymmetry; (ii) the organizational cost of protecting diffuse interests; and (iii) monopoly market power.97 The hypothesis advanced here is that
in modern economies, these factors tend to acquire
greater importance and consumers therefore require state
protection. Thus, the degree of consumer sovereignty
should vary from one sector to another in accordance with
the criteria mentioned. The following four subsections
discuss consumer sovereignty in telecommunications,
electricity and water supply on the basis of each criterion.
1. Asymmetry of Information: the Difficulty of
Evaluating Goods and Services
Yves Evrard & Alziro Rodrigues classify services
according to the degree of consumer access to information.98 Based on this classification, services are characterized by three types of attributes: (i) search attributes services whose attributes can be readily assessed by consumers via price and/or quality before purchase; (ii) experience attributes - services the consumer acquires
knowledge about and evaluates through experience after
they have been performed; and (iii) credibility attributes services whose complexity is so great that it is difficult to
evaluate their quality even after they have been rendered.99

97. See Oliveira, supra note 1, at 117.
98. Yves Evrard & Alziro Rodrigues, Uma Classificacdo de Servicos
Baseada na Teoria Microecon6micada Informacdo, 1 Bus. & ADMIN. ELEC. J.
1, at http://read.adm.ufrgs.br/readOl/artigo/evrard.htm#evrard (last visited
Oct. 23, 2001).
99. Id. at 4.
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Figure 10: Types of Service Attributes
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This classification scheme is summarized in Figure
10, while Figure 11 shows the results of our survey on the
perception of service attributes in telephony, electricity
and water supply. The latter is used as a proxy to compensate for lack of information on basic sanitation services.
Figure 11: Results of Survey on Perception of Service Attributes
Service

Attribute __..
___
..
Search
Experience
Credibility

Watering repair
Gas and electricity
provision
Telecommunication

4 (4.4%)
67(72.8%)
33 (35.9%) 43 (46.7%)

21 (228%):
16 (17.4%)

18 (19.6%) 60 (65.2%)

14 (15.2%)

Figure 11 shows that although consumers predominantly perceive experience attributes in all three
services, there are gradations in this classification. In water supply,"0 the perception of credibility attributes is also
significant (22.8%). This service is indeed more difficult to
evaluate than the others. As for gas and electricity supply, search and experience attributes are of roughly equal
importance. Evaluation of electricity is more immediate
than for other services. Lastly, telecommunications represents an intermediate case in which experience attributes
clearly predominate and the other two attribute's are of
approximately equivalent importance.

100. Water supply is taken to represent sanitation, given the similarity between these two services.
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2. Consumer Organization Cost
The relations between consumers and services in
telecommunications, electricity and water supply can also
be classified in accordance with consumer organization
cost. The relevant criteria for consumer organization cost
are associated with the cost of mobilizing diffuse interests
and the judicial costs potentially deriving from collective
action."' The more the interests involved are geographically dispersed, the less sovereignty there will be for individual consumers in exercising protection rights."2 The
theoretical problem arising from the question of diffuse
interests is that of "free riders," when organization cost is
higher than the individual benefits deriving from litigation, individuals under-invest in this type of action. Individual actors prefer to wait for other individuals to take
legal action so that they can opportunistically enjoy a
"free ride" by taking advantage of other people's initiatives.
A possible proxy for organization cost is the geographic dispersal of the consumers involved. For example,
consider the case of water and electricity consumers who
face a problem with quality of service: in general, these
consumers will tend to be geographically concentrated,
unlike consumers of telecommunications, especially in the
case of wireless telephony. On the other hand, the possibility of collective action by public and private consumer
protection agencies reduces organization cost and mitigates the "free rider" problem in dealing with issues of
consumer protection.
3. Market Power in Relevant Markets
The last criterion for classifying services from the
standpoint of consumer sovereignty is associated with the
amount of competition in the markets involved. As discussed in Section I, the consumer protection and competition policy functions act as mutual stimulants: more competitive economies enable more effective consumer protec101. Oliveira, supra note 1, at 119.
102. Id. at 120.
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tion inasmuch as they offer consumers more choice and
standards for comparison.0 3
Thus, the greater the competition and the bargaining power of consumers in a particular relevant market,
the greater the consumer's sovereignty will be. In the case
of water supply, consumers of the service in Sdo Paulo are
still subjected to a monopoly, "Sabesp." Consumers of telecommunications, on the other hand, already enjoy the
benefits of gradually increasing competition, both in wireless and in fixed-line telephony. In the case of electricity,
the key factor is the difference between free consumers,
who now enjoy the benefits of a certain amount of competition, and captive consumers, who do not yet have a
choice.
4. Classifying Sectors in Terms of Consumer Sovereignty
Figure 12 shows a possible classification of the
three sectors analyzing the above criteria. The more
points an activity has, the lower the degree of sovereignty
enjoyed by local consumers in exercising their rights and
the greater the need for regulation centralized in the federal sphere. Some explanation is necessary as an aid in
understanding Figure 12. The criterion "evaluation difficulty" is scored using the method propounded by Evrard
& Rodrigues.!" Geographic dispersal is used as a proxy for
consumer organization cost in each service. Thus, organization cost is higher in telecommunications since consumers of this service are usually more geographically dispersed, making coordination more costly for consumer
protection agencies. Market power can be measured indirectly by an indicator of market concentration, such as the
Simple Concentration Index (e.g., CR4) or the HerfindahlIlirschmann Index. 5 The greater the market power, the
more points are attributed to the service.

103. Id.
104. See Evrard & Rodrigues, supra note 98, at 4-5.
105. Id.

94
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Figure 12: Need for Centralized Regulation in Telecommunications, Electricity & Water Supply
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Considering the influence of the three criteria, the
higher the total score of a given service, the less autonomy consumers of the service will enjoy in exercising their
right to protection. Figure 11 shows that consumers of
telecommunications have the least autonomy while those
of electricity have the most. °6 What is the most efficient
way to set up the relationship between consumer protection and regulation in each case? Subsection C presents a
"menu" of possible institutional configurations involving
the relations between regulation and consumer protection.
C. Relations Between Regulation & Consumer Protection
The purpose of this section is to put forward alternative models for the institutional configuration of the
relationship between regulation and consumer protection.
One hypothesis underlying the construction of these models is that the lower the degree of consumer sovereignty,
the closer the links between consumer protection and
regulation will tend to be. This hypothesis is represented
in Figure 13.
106. For the sake of comparison, we have not considered free consumers of electricity. Their organization cost, bargaining power and ability to
evaluate the service make them far more autonomous in exercising protection
rights than captive consumers of electricity. The data on complaints processed in the Appendix would appear to refute this conclusion, since, in percentage terms, more complaints about telecommunications than electricity
were handled.
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Figure 13: Consumer Sovereignty vs. Relations Between Consumer Protection Agencies & Regulators
Consumer's
Sovereignty

Closer links between
consumer protection and regulation

In Figure 13, "S*" represents the maximum degree
of sovereignty consumers can obtain in exercising protection rights. When consumer sovereignty is limited, a
minimum of regulation will always be necessary, whether
it takes the form of public health inspection (performed by
the Agriculture Ministry's Federal Inspection Service
("SFI"), for example) or safety and technical standards
(performed, for example, by the National Institute of Metrology, Standardization & Industrial Quality ("Inmetro"),
an agency of the Development & Industry & Trade Ministry).
As discussed in Section IV.A, there is an area of intersection in the scope of the activities performed by the
agencies in charge of regulation and consumer protection.
While the same activities performed by regulators and
consumer protection agencies are specific to these functions, other activities may be shared. For example, inspection and prevention fall within the scope of both functions. Considering that these common activities could be
concentrated in one or another agency, it is possible to
conceive of a continuum of institutional configurations
between regulation and consumer protection, as shown in
Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Continuum of Institutional Configurations for
Relations Between Regulation & Consumer Protection
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Figure 14 defines five ideal models for the relationship between regulation and consumer protection: (i)
Regulated Protection; (ii) Consumer Expert; (iii) Shared
Protection; (iv) Technical Support; and (v) Deregulation.
Each of these models is characterized by an alternative
division of the performance of specific and shared functions. Services in which consumers enjoy less autonomy in
protecting their rights tend to adopt models more to the
left, and vice-versa. The five models are schematically
shown in Figure 15. In the Regulated Protection model,
all common functions are performed by the regulatory authority. In some cases, even the specific Consumer Protection function can be shared with the regulator.
Figure 15: Models for Configuring Relations Between
Regulation & Consumer Protection
A) Regulated Protection
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Shared Protection

In the "Consumer Expert" model, most activities
are performed by the regulator. The exception is inspection, which is shared with consumer protection agencies.
This model is appropriate for situations where consumers
enjoy very little autonomy and complex technical knowledge is required. In this case, consumer protection agencies invest in the figure of the expert who will assist them
with oversight and inspection. Here the consumer protection activities involved can also be shared with the regulator. This model is appropriate for consumer protection
in telecommunications, for example, where consumers enjoy little autonomy and complex technical knowledge is
required.
The third model is "Shared Protection," where inspection and prevention activities are shared, often
through contractual arrangements involving regulatory
authorities subordinated to state governments. This
model is appropriate for consumer protection in water
supply. Although the water companies are generally controlled by municipal governments, regulation depends on
state and regional coordination mechanisms involving
asymmetry of information between the regulatory authorities and the regulated company.
The fourth model is "Technical Support," where
most activities are performed at the local and state levels.
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The exception is prevention, which is shared with the
regulator. The fairly high level of technical knowledge required and the need for coordination among segments
calls for participation by a central regulatory agency, but
because consumers can easily evaluate the service, and
consumer organization cost is low (low geographic dispersal), consumer protection can be relatively decentralized.
The last model is "Deregulation," in which there
are no regulatory activities and all activities are conducted by the local and/or regional consumer protection
agencies. Given that there will always be some level of
regulation, this model is a theoretical possibility only.
In light of the proposed inverse relation between
consumer sovereignty and centralization of protection,
and considering the degree of consumer sovereignty in
telecommunications, electricity and water supply, as
shown in Figure 11, the relations between regulation and
consumer protection in telecommunications are associated
with a more centralized institutional set-up such as "regulated protection" or "consumer expert." Indeed, consumer
protection in this sector seems to be increasingly concentrated within the jurisdiction of Anatel, the federal telecommunications regulator. In water supply and electricity, the appropriate models would seem to be "shared protection" and "technical support" respectively, given the
local nature of service provision on one hand, and on the
other hand, the relative difficulty of evaluating water
supply services.
V. CONCLUSION

The principal conclusions drawn in this Article are
as follows: (i) consumer complaints have increased significantly in recent years; (ii) the volume of complaints has
increased most in regulated sectors; (iii) the need for consumer protection depends on the degree of consumer sovereignty, which in turn depends on the difficulty of
evaluation, market power and organization cost; (iv) the
smaller the degree of consumer sovereignty, the greater
the need for centralized protection and hence the more
regulators that will tend to get involved in consumer protection; (v) the actual configurations of the relationship
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between consumer protection and regulatory agencies in
the three selected infrastiucture sectors (telecommunications, electricity and water supply) match the hypothesis
developed in this study; (vi) there are no clearly defined
configurations for the relations between regulatory and
competition agencies; and (vii) the combination of small
scope economies and low bureaucratic transaction costs
suggests that consumer protection and competition policy
would best be kept separate in terms of their operations.
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FOOD
HEALTH
HOUSING
PRODUCTS
SERVICES
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
INSPECTION
EXTRA-PROCON
CAD-PESQ
TOTAL

POLICY & PROTECTION
______

QUERIES
948
9,674
21,825
25,414
39,254
17,682
0
33,726
35,861
184,384

- SL

COMPLAINTS -TOTA

78
2,607
2,085
11,383
12,003
4,860
0
0
0
33,016

327
3,120
1,180
6,875
6,883
2,311
228
0
0
20,924-

_____

QUERIES
1,480
12,750
19,385
38,533
80,153
45,183
0
56,835
33,551
287,870

SL
106
3,265
2,460
11,775
20,893
11,252
0
0
0
49,751

COMPLAINTS
316
2,361
1,491
7,555
12,620
6,141
329
0
0
30,813

1999,
AREAS
FOOD
HEALTH
HOUSING
PRODUCTS
SERVICES
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
INSPECTION
EXTRA-PROCON
CAD-PESQ

2000
AREAS
FOOD
HEALTH
HOUSING
PRODUCTS
SERVICES
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
INSPECTION
EXTRA-PROCON
CAD-PESQ
TOTAL

-

1,353
15,401
25,090
43,672
58,140
24,853
228
33,726
35,861
238,3247,

QUERIES

QUERIES

COMPLAINTS

COMPLAINTS

TOTAL
692
16,244
13,344
34,864
115,299
49,951
0
67,641
0
298,035

TOTAL

285,227

TOT.I
1,902
18,376
23,336
57,863
113,666
62,576
329
56,835
33,551
368,434':'
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A.2.: Regressions Results
It is assumed a log-linear function, as in: y = Aefh
where y is the number of complaints and x are years. The
table shows results:

a
s. d.
Beta
s. d.
F
R2
Observations

Other ,
Total,
. Regulated_
'Comptaintsl
Service
Servlcee
10,58
9,25
6,02
0,23
0,76
0,32
0,05
0,23
0,09
0,04
0,05
0,14
2,13
3,04
2,9
0,38
0,3
0,29
7
9
7

